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SCOPE OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW: THE TERMINIELLO
CASE IN FOCUS*
THE Supreme Court has long maintained two self-imposed limitations on
the scope of its appellate review. First, the Court has traditionally refused
to consider issues not raised in the courts below.' Second, it ordinarily re-
fuses to consider issues not properly presented on petition for certiorari, a
practice incorporated in Rule 38 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.2 Both
limitations are justified in part by the convenience they afford to the Court
itself. By insisting that issues be raised in courts below the Court obtains
the benefit of lower court decisions and the research and reasoning on which
they were based. Similarly, Rule 38 saves the Court the trouble of searching
entire records for issues which are important but well-concealed.
These restrictions serve other ends as well. Insofar as state court judg-
ments are concerned, the policy of refusing to consider issues not raised
below tends to promote harmonious relations between state and federal
courts.3 And Rule 38, by requiring clear presentation of issues for which
review is sought, gives to litigants full opportunity to brief and argue any
* Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
1. See First National Bank v. Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353, 363 (U.S. 1869); Otis v.
Bacon, 7 Cranch 589, 596 (U.S. 1813).
2. See Revised Rules of the Supreme Court, 306 U.S. 685 (1939), as amended, 335
U.S. 915 (1948). Rule 38 (governing review on writ of certiorari of decisions of state
courts, circuit courts of appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia) par. 3: "The petition shall contain a summary and short statement of the
matter involved; a statement particularly disclosing the basis upon which it is contended
that this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment or decree in question; ... the
questions presented; and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the writ. Only the
questions specifically brought forward by the petition for writ of certiorari will be con-
sidered." See Dickinson Industrial Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, MS9 (1940); Gen-
eral Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 178, 179 (1938)
(Court will consider only questions raised in the petition, not those raised in supporting
brief).
3. This policy had an early historical importance. Section 25 of the original Ju-
diciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court power to review state court decisions in-
volving federal matters. But the validity of this grant was vigorously challenged by the
states, some of whom thought that there was no constitutional warrant for any redew
by the United States Supreme Court of state court decisions. Moom, CommzrmAn osr
THE JUDICUL CODE 565 (1949). The power of review was upheld in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U.S. 1816), and eventually the furor quieted down. Meanwhile,
however, the Supreme Court found it politic to keep its review of state court judgments
narrowly confined, and this policy, once started, carried on by its own momentum long
after the historical context in which it was born had changed. It would seem, there-
fore, that there is no longer such necessity for deference to state courts as to require the
Supreme Court to follow its traditional practice in all cases. Tradition is a poor de-
fense for a decision contrary to the demands of justice.
For further discussion of the scope of Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state de-
cisions, see Moom, op. cit. supra, at 565-78.
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issue-which might serve as the basis for disposition of their case. 4 The rule
therefore promotes the interests not of the courts alone but of the litigants
for whose benefit the courts sit.
But strict adherence to these limitations on the scope of review may lead
to obvious injustice. Hence the Court has never considered them absolutely
'binding. Where there has been "fundamental error" clearly determinative
of the case, the Supreme Court will consider the issue even though it was
not raised below ' or properly presented in the petition for writ of cer-
tiorari.6 Where strict application of the doctrines would frustrate the obvious
intent of the parties,7 or where the decision of a state court necessarily in-
4. In Flournoy 'v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 259 (1944), the Court said, "It Is a ft-
miliar rule, consistently followed, that upon appeal from a state court this Court will
not pass upon or consider federal questions not assigned as error or designated in the
points to be relied upon even though properly presented to and passed upon by the state
court. [citing cases]. The rule is the same in the case of applications for certiorari.
Rule 38, p. 2; [citipg cases]." And again, at 261, the Court said, "But this question is
not before us because appellant, by his statement of points to be relied upon, has affirma-
tively excluded it from consideration on this appeal. . . .In any case we ought not con-
sider it here because in reliance upon this declaration neither party has briefed or ar-
gued it in this Court. Rule 27,.par. 6 declares that errors not urged in the briefs will be
disregarded. Arid, independently of 'technical' rules it is not the habit of this Court to
decide important constitutional questions which the parties have not presented, briefed
or argued."
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Frankfurter argued that the federal question had been
adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Louisiana and was properly before the Supreme
Court of the United States, "unless the duties of this Court . . .hang on the thread of
mere verbalism." Id. at 264. He concluded: "We ought not to create a constitutional
grievance which the parties themselves have never entertained in order to avoid adjudi-
cation of the only question which has been in the case from the beginning." Id. at 275.
5. Rule 27, par. 6, provides: "When there is no assignment of errors, counsel will
not be heard, except at the request of the Court; and errors not specified according to
this rule will be disregarded, save as the Court at its option may notice a plain error
not assigned or specified." (Emphasis added). See also Rules of the Supreme Court 9
and 13, par. 9. Analogous provisions are contained in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941) (where a Rule of Civil Procedure specifically exempted from punishment
for contempt the refusal to obey an order to submit to physical or mental examination,
although action of lower courts in treating it as such was not assigned as error in Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, the error is of such a fundamental nature that the Court must
notice it) ; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) (that warrant lacks finding required by
statute is such a plain and fundamental error that Court will notice it, although not in-
cluded in assignment of errors).
6. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); see Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278
U.S. 63, 64, 65 (1928).
7. See Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 273, 274 (1944) (dissenting opinion);
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 64 (1928) (if the record as a whole shows either
expressly or by clear intendment that the validity of a state statute was in question, the
claim of invalidity will be regarded as having been adequately presented).
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volved determination of a federal question," the Court has set the doctrines
aside. And occasionally the Court has disregarded obvious technical imper-
fections such as failure to state that the federal Constitution was involved.
In the much publicized case of Terminiello v. City of Cikago 10 the Su-
preme Court again departed from these two long-standing practices and
ruled on a substantive constitutional issue which neither party had raised
or argued at any time. Newspapers and legal periodicals, in discussing the
case, have concentrated on the substantive issues of free speech." Almost
overlooked in this battle of words has been the procedural aberration which
made the decision possible.
Arthur Terminiello was found guilty, in the Municipal Court of Chicago,
of violating a city ordinance 12 by giving a speech which tended to a breach
of the peace. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Appellate
Court for the First District,'" and by the Supreme Court of Illinois.14 Re-
viewing the- case on certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the courts of Illinois on the ground that the trial judge, in
his charge to the jury, so broadly construed the ordinance under which
petitioner was convicted as to make it unconstitutional.' 5 Yet no exception
8. See Sayward v. Denny, 158 U.S. ISO, 184 (1S94) (where it appears by, clear
and necessary intendment that a federal question was directly involved so that the state
court could not have given judgment without deciding it, the Supreme Court has juris-
diction) ; Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1SS9) (if decision of a fed-
eral question is necessarily involved in the judgment rendered, it is immaterial that the
state court avoided all reference to the question).-
9. In Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928), the petition for writ of
habeas corpus (denied by the state courts), although asserting that the state statute
under -which petitioner was being held was "unconstitutional," failed to specify any con-
stitutional provision, federal or state, involved. The Court said: "No particular form
of words or phrases is essential, but only that the claim of invalidity and the ground
therefor be brought to the attention of the state court with fair precision and in due
time." See Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 273, 274 (1944) (dissenting opinion). But
cf. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 287 U.S. 86, 91 (1932).
10. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
11. Rosenwein, The Supreme Court and Frecdomn of Speccls-Tcrminicllo v. City
of Chicago, 9 LAw. Gunn REv. 70 (1949) ; Notes, 29 B.U.L. REv. 556 (1949) ; 18 ForD. I.
REv. 283 (1949) ; 38 Go. L. J. 94 (1949) ; 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rnv. 885 (1949) ; 25 NorE
D LAw. 99 (1949).
12. "All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in maling any im-
proper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of
the peace, within the limits of the city... shall be deemed guilty of disorderly con-
duct, and upon conviction thereof, shall be severally fined not less than one dollar nor
more than two hundred dollars for each offense." Crr oF CRCAO REV. CoDE c. 1, § 1
(1) (1939).
13. 332 III. App. 17, 74 N.E2d 45 (Ist Dist. 1947).
14. 400 Ill. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39 (1948).
15. Justice Douglas objected to the following portion of the jury charge: "The court
instructs the jury that breach of the peace consists of any misbehavior which violates
the public peace and decorum. The misbehavior may constitute a breach of the peace
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to the particular jury charge had been taken by the petitioner; 11 the issue
had not been raised before the Illinois appellate courts; nor had it appeared
in the petition for writ of certiorari as a "question presented" or "point to be
relied upon," 17 as required by Rule 38 of the Supreme Court Rules.18
if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or cre-
ates a disturbance, or it it inolests the inhabitants in he enjoyment of peace and quidt
by arousing alarm... "' (emphasis added). Transcript of Record, p. 129, Tcrminiello
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). The words admittedly used by the petitioner
(e.g., "scum" and "slimy scum," directed to members of the audience) were such as to
provoke such comments from the audience as "kill the Jews," "get rid of Jews, niggers
and Catholics," "cripple them," "sterilize them." Undeniably, a disturbance was created
by the use of these words, and thus if the other, objectionable phrases of the jury charge
were deleted, the ordinance might, as construed, meet the test of constitutionality as es-
tablished by the Chaplinsky case. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Justice Vinson's separate dissent implicitly raises the question as to whether petitioner
was harmed by the erroneous jury charge, inasmuch as the appellate courts of Illinois
affirmed the conviction because they thought that the jury had found Terminiello's words
to be "fighting words" within the meaning of the Chaplinsky decision. 332 Ill. App. 17,
23, 38, 74 N.E.2d 45, 48, 54; 400 Ill. 23, 33, 79 N.E.2d 39, 45. It is this question which
Justice Douglas agreed in his opening statement was brought before the Supreme Court
for determination, although not decided in the majority opinion.
16. Rule 62 of the Municipal Court of Chicago relating to instructing the jury spe-
cifically provides that "(3) Objections to the charge must be made before the jury re-
tire and out of the presence of the jury. They must specifically point out wherein the
part objected to is erroneous and the party objecting must indicate clearly the correction
therein desired to be made, and upon the objections being made the judge may make
such corrections as he may deem proper."
The requirement that exceptions must be specific is contained in Supreme Court
holdings as well as in Rule 62, supra. See e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 119
(1943) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 287 U.S. 86, 91 (1932) (assignment as error
court's failure properly to instruct jury is too vague and indefinite to permit considera-
tion) ; McDermott v. Severe, 202 U.S. 600, 610 (1910) ("It has been too frequently held
to require the extended citation of cases that an exception of this general character will
not cover specific objections, which in fairness to the court ought to have been called
to its attention in order that if necessary, it could correct or modify them"). Counsel
for Terminiello did object to plaintiff's requested instructions, the substance of which
the court subsequently incorporated in part into the charge to the jury, not on the
ground that it contravened the constitution but simply that "This is not the law, conse-
quently it does not fit the facts." [sic] Transcript of Record, p. 128, Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
17. Only a most patient analysis of the lengthy and confused record of the case re-
veals the intention of Terminiello with respect to the debatable issue. le mentions the
construction of the ordinance in the purely rhetorical "question presented," but did not
attack it as such, and his reasons relied on, for allowance of the writ were (1) that the
judgments of the lower courts were repugnant to prior decisions of the Supreme Court;
(2) that his conviction would constitute a "previous restraint" upon the right of the
citizens of Chicago to speak and assemble freely; and (3) that there was no breach of
the peace. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 9, Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949).1 18. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, pointed out that the ground for reversal was
explicitly disclaimed on behalf of Terminiello at the bar of Court. He vigorously ob-
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In thus disregarding its traditional rules, the Court may have felt that
the parties actually intended to put the issue before both the Illinois courts
and the Supreme Court." Although Terminiello did not dispute the consti-
tutionality of the ordinance "on its face" or as construed in the judge's
charge, 2 he clearly maintained throughout that a conviction under this
jected to the fact that the majority saw fit "to inject an error into the record in order
to avoid the issue on which the case was brought.., for certainly relief from the
payment of a fine of $100 could not alone have induced this Court to excogitate a de-
fect in the judgment which counsel thoughtfully rejected and which three State courts
did not consider... ." 337 U.S. 1, 12. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 362, 363
(1927) (the presence of one properly presented question does not authorize the Court
to search the record for others not so presented). Justice Vinson dissented on the ground
that the Illinois courts had never considered, and therefore could not be thought to have
affirmed, the construction placed upon the ordinance. Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
supra, at 7. A federal claim "must" have been denied, or a state statute upheld, by
the highest court of the state in order for the Supreme Court to have jurisdiction on
certiorari or appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1948). See CIO v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472, 477
(1944).
19. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949). "Petitioner raised both
points--that his speech was protected by the Constitution; that the inclusion of his speech
within the ordinance was a violation of the Constitution. ... The record makes clear
that petitioner at all times challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance as con-
strued and applied to him.'
20. The Court, citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, pointed out that the
construction by the highest state court was binding on the Supreme Court. The
Winters case dealt with a New York statute banning obscene publications. Petitioner
challenged the statute as unconstitutional on its face for being "obscure and indefinite."
By failing to take exception to the jury charge, however, he failed to challenge the
clarification by means of which the lower court attempted to preserve the constitutionality
of the ordinance. The Supreme Court, finding the law invalid on its face, considered
only the question of whether as construed it might be clear enough to pass the test of
constitutionality. On this basis the statute vas invalidated. In so doing, it ruled that
the interpretation of a statute by a court "puts these words [of interpretation] in the
statute as clearly as if it had been so amended by the legislature." Id. at 514. Had Ter-
miniello ever challenged the constitutionality of the municipal ordinance on its face, the
Winters case might have been a-proper precedent for the Court to reverse the state court
because of the construction of that ordinance.
The Court also cited Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, in defense of its disre-
gard of Terminiello's failure to take proper exception to the jury charge. In the
Stromberg case petitioner challenged the validity of the statute on its face, but did not
take exception to the instructions to the jury. The Supreme Court nonetheless consid-
ered the trial court's charge which, stated in the disjunctive, permitted conviction on
any one of three grounds. Finding one of these grounds unconstitutional, the deci-
sion was reversed; for it was "impossible to say under which clause of the statute the
conviction was obtained." (Id. at 368). The Stromberg case is no square precedent for
the Court's interference in the Terminiello case, even though, as the Court noted, the
charge to the jury in the Teriniella case was also stated in the disjunctive. In the
Stromberg case the Court held that "an attack on the statute as a whole wvas equally an
attack on each of its individual parts." But Terminiello attacked the Chicago ordinance
neither "as a whole" nor as to any of its parts.
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ordinance would be an unconstitutional abridgement of his rights tinder the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.21 TheCourt may have concluded that
since the appellant was challenging the application of the ordinance, he was
also challenging the trial judge's construction on which the application was
based. In a sense, this was true. In denying that the ordinance should be
applied to him at all, Terminielto was contending that no construction could
be valid. unless it yielded a directed verdict 22 or binding instructions to the
jury for acquittal,23 a construction which he did not get.
But the Court's conclusion, if 'such it was, erased a distinction between
two substantially different levels of constitutional attack, each of which
necessitates'a different kind-of rebuttal argumeht by those defending a con-
viction. It is one thing to maintain, as Terminiello clearly did, that a statute
cannot under any construction be constitutionally applied to a particular
set of facts. It is quite another to claim that even though the statute, if con-
strued in certain -ways
, could be applied to those fa&ts, the actual construc-
tion given in the charge to the jury was so broad as to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. This claim Terminiello'did not make, and the record indicates
that his failure wasdue not to a technical oversight but to a specific inten-
tion not to make it. 2 4 Since counsel for the city of Chicago was thus pre-
21. Transcript of Record, pp. 55, 84, 126, Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949).
22. Transcript of Record, p. -84, Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
On the motion for directed verdict, Terminiello argued that "[tihe basis is the first
amendment to the United States Constitution; Father Terminiello had a right to say
what he said and what he said was protected by the first amendment to the Constitu-
tion, that the charge in this case, namely, a diversion tending to a breach of the peace,
if it is constitutional under the first amendment, could not prohibit free speech or tend
to prohibit free speech, otherwise it would be unconstitutional." He was here challenging
a construction yet to" be placed upon the ordinance:by the court, in saying that the ordi-
nance, no matter how construed, "could not, prohibit free tpeech or tend to prohibit free
speech." Similarly, he said that "to charge this defendant with committing a misdemeanor
because he gave the speech in question is a contravention 6f the first amendment to the
constitution," (emphasis added) . The trial judge, in overruling these motions, did not
consent to this construction of the, ordinance. 2He said nothing, however, regarding the
proper construction until he charged the jury,
23. At the end of 'the trial, Terminiello's counsel was apparently willing to concede
that the ordinance inight be construed constitutionally. Although his requested instruc,
tions were concerned largely with the proper legal definition of a, "public meeting place,"
he also asked that the jury be instructed.that "no danger flowing from speech can be
deemed clear and present unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent
that it may befall before there is opportunity for discussion." Transcript of Record, pp,
126-7, Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
24. Terminiello throughout insisted that the ordinance no ma'ter how construed
could not constitutionally be applied to his speech. See Transcript of Record, pp. 55,
84, 126. With the exception of the instructions which he requested be given the jury
(see note 23 supra) he nowhere conceded'that the ordinance might, properly construed,
apply to him. His failure to object :to the jury charge given, his failurd to raise the
issue in the appelate courts of Illinois,. and hig explicit denial at the bar of the Su.
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cluded at all times from arguing the point, the Court in deciding the case
on an issue not raised was neglecting the policy of fairness to litigants which
underlies Rule 38.
But the Court's decision to overlook Rule 38 probably was not based on
reflections concerning Terminiello's intentions. It is more likely that the
Court was motivated by an understandable and entirely justifiable desire
not only to reach -what it considered to be a correct result in this case, but
also to prevent future convictions under a too-broadly construed ordi-
nance.2 5 There is no irreconcilable conflict, however, between the policy
underlying Rule 38 and the desire to determine substantive constitutional
issues. The Court could have resolved the dilemma by granting the city of
Chicago's petition for rehearing.23 The litigants would thus have been
afforded adequate opportunity to brief and argue the issue which the Court
considered "dispositive of the case." This is a right to which they should be
entitled, even though in this particular case, where the trial judge's charge
seemed undeniably defective, the granting of the petition might have made
no difference in the ultimate result. Another alternative would have been
to remand the case to the Illinois Supreme Court for a specific ruling on the
appropriateness of the trial judge's construction of the ordinance." This
preme Court that the trial court's erroneous construction of the ordinance %as the basis
upon which he sought reversal, indicate that he intentionally distinguished "application"
from "construction." Cf. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 200, 201 (1943)
(where defense counsel waived his objection to prosecutor's comment by failing to take
exception to the jury charge, and when that objection did not appear in the motion for
new trial or assignment of error, the waiver will not be considered mere inadvertency
or oversight).
That the record in the Terntiniello case contains innumerable ambiguities is a fact
which cannot be overemphasized. Counsel for Terminiello in his motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial (Transcript of Record, p. 55) made vague
references to the instructions given the jury: "The court improperly gave to the jury the
instructions objected to by the defendant." But he failed to make any objection whatso-
ever to the jury charge. "The court erred in refusing to give certain instructions re-
quested by the defendant." But what certain instructions the court erred in omitting
are not indicated. See note 16 supra. Under Illinois practice, it is mandatory for an
appellant to set forth all of the instructions for the plaintiff and the defendant in order
to obtain a review based on an instruction. It is clear from the Transcript of the Rec-
ord that Terminiello's counsel omitted some of the court's instructions. Inasmuch as
he thus violated state practice, and the Supreme Court is bound by the law of Illinois, it
is arguable whether even had an objection been seasonably made the Supreme Court
could have considered this objection.
25. The expedient of granting a rehearing in appropriate cases would be a desirable
departure from the usual practice of refusing to consider issues raised neither in the
courts below nor on appeal. If strictly adhered to, these limitations might easily be-
come in other cases distressing barriers to legitimate but inexpertly pleaded claims of un-
sophisticated litigants.
26. The Petition for Rehearing was denied, June 13, 1949. 337 U.S. 934 (1949).
27. This alternative is probably more appropriate to cases where the state court's
decision has been incomplete or ambiguous. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948)
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